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Consistent with the trend discernible in the early
part of this decade, the Supreme Court in its
1975-76 term continues to move away from the
liberalism of the Warren years and has struck a
long-overdue and more delicate balance between the
rights of citizens and defendants. This balance is best
exemplified by the Court's long-awaited decisions in
the death penalty cases. I It is in those decisions that
the Court has articulated its concern that, although
punishment must accord with "the dignity of man," 2
the legitimate views and purposes of society as to a
given form of punishment must be taken into con-
sideration.
The death penalty decisions, however dramatic in
effect and impact, were not the only opinions handed
down this term that reflect the Court's movement
toward greater protection of society. Thus, with its
decisions in Fisher v. United States, 3 United States v.
Miller, ' and Andresen v. Maryland, I the Court has
taken substantial steps toward alleviating the confu-
sion that has existed-particularly for government
investigators and prosecutors-concerning the pro-
cedure to be employed, consistent with the fourth and
fifth amendments, to obtain documents from poten-
tial defendants. As prosecutors throughout the nation
intensify their efforts in the investigation and prose-
cution of white collar and official corruption crimes,
these decisions should prove to be particularly sig-
nificant. Additionally, street level law enforcement
against the traffic in illicit drugs was given a boost by
the Court's ruling *in Hampton v. United States"
* United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois.
'Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.Ct.
2950; Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S.Ct. 3001.(1976).
2Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2925, quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
3425 U.S. 391 (1976).
4425 U.S. 394 (1976).
'96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976).
0425 U.S. 484 (1976).
that entrapment is not necessarily established as a
matter of law when government agents and a predis-
posed defendant act in concert with one another.
Not all of this term's decisions went against
defendants. In Doyle v. Ohio, 'the Court declined to
read Miranda v. Arizona8 as permitting the
impeachment use of a defendant's post-arrest silence.
And Goldberg v. United StatesI flatly rejected the
government's position that a "work product" excep-
tion exists under the Jencks Act. to Finally, in a
particularly significant case, Nebraska Press Associ-
ation v. Stuart, "the Court has made new law in the
area of fair trial-free press by ruling that prior
restraints on pre-trial publicity are unconstitutional.
FInrH AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Court was particularly productive this term
in the area of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Its decisions ranged from the
nature of a defendant's fifth amendment rights
during both custodial and non-custodial interroga-
tion to the issue of the interaction between the fourth
and fifth amendments in connection with efforts of
law enforcement authorities to obtain documents.
In two cases of particular significance to govern-
ment investigators and prosecutors, the Court de-
clined to enlarge an accused's rights under Miranda
v. Arizona. " It held in Beckwith v. United States "
that a taxpayer, questioned in a non-custodial
setting by Special Agents of the Internal Revenue
Service who were investigating him for possible
criminal tax violations, need not be given the
warnings mandated by Miranda. Accordingly, state-
ments made to the agents and records obtained
during the course of the interview were deemed
admissible into evidence in the taxpayer's subsequent
trial for tax fraud.
796 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).
8384 U.S. 436 (1966).
s425 U.S. 94 (1976).
to18 U.S.C. §3500 (1970).
196 S.Ct. 2791 (1976).
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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The Court's decision in Beckwith can hardly be
termed unexpected since, except for Dickerson v.
United States "'and its progeny, "sit accords with the
weight of authority on the issue. "'Moreover, as the
Court stressed, acceptance of the taxpayer's
argument-that the principle of Miranda was
applicable because the taxpayer was the "focus" of
an investigation and was therefore during the inter-
view in the functional and thus legal equivalent of the
classic Miranda situation-would require the Court
to ignore the central point on which Miranda turned:
the coercive aspect of custodial interrogation. Justice
Brennan, dissenting, viewed the interrogation at
issue as having the "practical consequence" of
compelling the taxpayer to make disclosures and as
therefore fully comparable to the formal custody
situation involved in Miranda. The majority, how-
ever, pointed out that "custodial interrogation," as
specifically defined in Miranda, means "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." "From
the record, which disclosed that the taxpayer was
interviewed in a private home, concededly was not
under arrest or otherwise detained and was advised
of his rights to remain silent and to confer with
counsel, 18 the Court could find no evidence of a
custodial situation such as that upon which Miranda
was bottomed. Quite properly, however, the Court
did not lay down a blanket rule that would preclude
all challenges to the admissibility of evidence
obtained during the course of a non-custodial inter-
view. Rather, recognizing that in some non-custodial
interviews an interrogation nonetheless may be coer-
cive, the Court noted that it would be the duty of a
reviewing court to examine the entire record and
make an independent determination of the issue of
'413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
"
5 United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir.
1974).
16See, e.g., United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 16
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765,
771 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); United
States v. MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947, 950 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971); United States v. Jaskie-
wica, 433 F.2d 415, 417-20 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021, 1027-31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 221-
22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968).
'7425 U.S. at 347, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 444.
"
8 Mr. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment on
the ground that the warnings actually given to the taxpayer
satisfied the requirements of the fifth amendment.
voluntariness. In such a case, the presence or absence
of warnings would be relevant to the issue of whether
the interrogation was in fact coercive.
United States v. Mandujano, 19one of the Court's
few unanimous decisions in the criminal law area
this term, " further defined Miranda's limits. In
Mandujano, the Court ruled that Miranda warnings
need not be given to a grand jury witness who is in
the position of a "virtual" or "putative" defendant.
As in Beckwith, the Court stressed the lack of
custodial coercion envisioned in Miranda. In the
Court's view, Miranda "simply did not perceive
judicial inquiries and custodial interrogation as
equivalents." 21 To extend the Miranda focus on
police interrogation in a custodial setting "to ques-
tioning before a grand jury inquiring into criminal
activity under the guidance of a judge is an extrava-
gant expansion never remotely contemplated by this
Court in Miranda; the dynamics of constitutional
interpretation do not compel constant extension of
every doctrine announced by the Court." 22
While the Court plainly held that a grand jury
witness is not entitled to be given the Miranda
warnings at the inception of his testimony, it failed to
provide much guidance on what warnings, if any,
need be given. Since the witness in Mandujano was
in fact warned of his fifth amendment privilege, the
Court deemed it unnecessary to consider whether this
warning is required.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
concurred in the plurality opinion but would have
held that the government may not call before the
grand jury an individual whom it has probable cause
to suspect committed a crime and, absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, use "judicial compulsion" to
cause him to testify with regard to that crime. In
Justice Brennan's view, such a waiver would be
demonstrated by proof that the individual was
warned of his fifth amendment privilege and his
status as a putative defendant prior to being ques-
tioned. As a practical matter, the question left open
by the plurality opinion is not a critical one, for
prudent prosecutors at both the state and federal
level consistently make it a practice to warn a grand
jury witness of the fifth amendment privilege prior to
questioning.
In Harris v. New York" the Court held in 1971
'9425 U.S. 564 (1976).
2 Mandujano was an 8-0 decision. Mr. Justice Stevens
took no part in the decision.
2 1425 U.S. at 579.
22Id. at 580.
23401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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that post-arrest statements taken from a defendant in
violation of the dictates of Miranda could be used at
trial for impeachment purposes. In Doyle v. Ohio, 24
decided this term, the Court declined to view the
Harris rationale as supportive of the impeachment
use of a defendant's post-arrest silence. 25 More
specifically, the Court ruled that a prosecutor may
not seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story,
told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining him
about his failure to have told that story at the time of
his arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reasoned
that an arrestee's silence following the warnings may
be nothing more than his exercise of Miranda rights;
accordingly, "every post-arrest silence is insoluably
ambiguous." 2 6 Since the Miranda warnings carry an
implicit assurance that silence will incur no penal-
ties, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the
arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an
explanation offered at trial.
Doyle, then, clearly is a firm response to those who
have assailed the Burger Court for what they have
perceived as the Court's steady erosion of the
principle of Miranda. Ironically, it comes in a
case where the defendants' silence was so totally
inconsistent with their trial testimony that, as Jus-
tice Stevens correctly points out in dissent, their
silence plainly was tantamount to a prior inconsist-
ent statement and thus admissible for purposes of
impeachment. In the dissenters' view, which is
unassailably rational under the particular facts of the
case, the Miranda warnings provided the only
plausible explanation for the defendants' silence at
the time of their arrest; therefore, on cross-examina-
tion, the logical response to questions about why they
remained silent would have been that they relied on
the warning that they had the right to remain silent.
Since that was not their response, the Court's due
process rationale fails.
While Doyle may be viewed as a refusal to cut
back on Miranda, the Court nonetheless will un-
doubtedly continue to be criticized by civil libertari-
ans for its decision in Michigan v. Mosley. "Looking
at the two cases, there are those who will view them
as a simultaneous giving and taking away. A more
2496 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).
25In United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), the
Court decided on evidentiary grounds that the prosecution's
use of ihe defendant's post-arrest silence was impermissibly
prejudicial. By the Court's decision in Doyle, that ruling
has achieved constitutional status.
2696 S.Ct. at 2244.
27423 U.S. 96 (1975).
rational approach, however, suggests that the Court
has engaged in some fine line drawing, and while line
drawing does not necessarily reflect good judgment
or result in good judgments, the one drawn, at least
in Mosley, is a rational one. There, the defendant
was arrested by one police officer for suspicion of
robbery. At the police station, he was advised of his
rights under Miranda. When he indicated he did not
want to answer any questions about the robberies,
the arresting officer ceased interrogation. Two hours
later, however, a different officer, after first advising
the defendant of his rights, began questioning him
about a different crime, a murder. The defendant
shortly thereafter implicated himself in the murder.
At no time did the defendant indicate that he did not
wish to discuss the murder, nor did he ask to consult
with a lawyer. The Court held that the defendant's
assertion of his privilege as to one line of questioning
by the first police officer did not prohibit, under the
principle of Miranda, questioning by the second
officer about a different criminal matter. In reaching
its decision, the Court reasoned that Miranda must
be read in light of its intention to permit one in
custody to cut off questioning at any time. The
requirement that law enforcement authorities respect
the exercise of that right was seen as counteracting
the "coercive pressures of the custodial setting." 28
The Court concluded that under the facts of the case,
the defendant's right to cut off questioning was
"scrupulously honored." 29
Mr. Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that:
[T]he task confronting the Court is not whether
voluntary statements will be excluded, but whether the
procedures approved will be sufficient to assure with
reasonable certainty that a confession is not obtained
under the influence of the compulsion inherent in in-
terrogation and detention. "
In Justice Brennan's view, the procedures approved
by the Court failed to provide that assurance because
the issue of compulsion was not faced directly. He
thus concluded that Mosley's rights had been vio-
lated because his failure to opt to remain silent upon
renewed questioning was "presumptively the conse-
quence of an overbearing in which detention and that
subsequent questioning played central roles." $I
Justice Brennan's thesis relies upon the premise
that detention, however brief, together with a very




0Id. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting).3 11d. at 115.
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But surely Miranda did not mean that, for, as Justice
White noted in his concurring opinion, Miranda said
that if a statement is taken outside the presence of an
attorney and after the suspect has indicated a desire
to remain silent, the government bears a heavy
burden to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent
waiver. As the facts demonstrate, that burden was
certainly satisfied in this case. Moreover, as Justice
White noted, the holding in the case is a limited one,
presumably circumscribed by its facts.
A third custodial interrogation case before the
Court this term which presented a significant fifth
amendment issue was left undecided for the time
being. In Ohio v. Gallagher 2 the issue was whether
the admission into evidence of statements made by an
accused in response to custodial interrogation by his
parole officer violated the dictates of Miranda. The
facts of Gallagher disclosed that the accused was
arrested, charged with armed robbery and advised of
his Miranda rights by two detectives. Four days
later, while he was still in jail, Gallagher's parole
officer sought to question him about the robbery as a
possible parole violation. Although Gallagher de-
clined to discuss the matter at that time, he gave a
detailed statement to the parole officer a week later
during the officer's return visit. At no time did the
parole officer advise Gallagher of his rights under
Miranda. At Gallagher's trial, the parole officer
testified as to the incriminating statement made by
Gallagher. A majority of the Court remanded the
case to the Ohio Supreme Court, which had reversed
Gallagher's conviction, for clarification as to whether
that court had relied on the federal Constitution,
state law, or both, in rendering its decision. Resolu-
tion of the issue raised in Gallagher should reveal
whether the Court's holding in Mosley is, in fact, a
limited one.
Two other cases in the fifth amendment area
which were decided this term, Fisher v. United
States " and Andresen v. Maryland, "' should prove
to be highly significant and will be warmly welcomed
by government investigators and prosecutors, par-
ticularly those working on documents cases in the
official corruption and white collar crimes areas.
In Fisher the Court held that an attorney's
production, pursuant to a lawful Internal Revenue
Service summons, of his client's tax records prepared
by the taxpayer's accountant and transferred to the
attorney by the taxpayer, did not violate the taxpay-
32425 U.S. 257 (1976).
33425 U.S. 391 (1976).
"'96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976).
er's fifth amendment privilege. This is so, according
to Mr. Justice White, because: (1) enforcement of the
summons against the taxpayers's attorney would not
compel the taxpayer since the documents sought were
not the taxpayer's, were not prepared by the tax-
payer and did not contain his testimonial declara-
tions; (2) insofar as the documents sought contained
private information, the fifth amendment could not
be invoked since it protects compelled testimony,
not the disclosure of private information, and en-
forcement of the summons did not involve com-
pelled testimony; (3) the attorney-client privilege
could not be relied upon by the taxpayer because
the documents were not privileged in the hands of
the taxpayer and thus were not protected in the
attorney's hands; and (4) the pronouncement in
Boyd v. United States"' that "seizure, under war-
rant or otherwise, of any purely evidentiary mate-
rials violated the Fourth Amendment and that the
Fifth Amendment rendered these seized materials in-
admissible" 6 is no longer good law because, under
cases decided after Boyd, purely evidentiary though
non-testimonial evidence may be searched for and
seized under appropriate circumstances. Therefore,
since the documents sought did not compel the tax-
payer's own testimonial communications, the fifth
amendment privilege could not be invoked.
A question left open in Fisher-whether the fifth
amendment would protect an individual from pro-
ducing his own records in his possession-was
answered in Andresen. There, the Court ruled that
the forcible law enforcement seizure of an individu-
al's business records from his offices did not violate
that person's fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Although the seized records
clearly contained incriminating information, includ-
ing statements made by their owner, he nonetheless
was not compelled to be a witness against himself
because the statements contained in the records were
voluntarily committed to writing; the records were
not produced by their owner, but rather were seized
by law enforcement authorities; and at trial, they
were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by
the owner.
In addition to the practical impact of Fisher and
Andresen for investigators and prosecutors, the legal
ramifications are great, for the Boyd rule-that the
compelled production of "mere evidence," including
private documents, by seizure or subpoena violates
the fourth amendment and therefore the fifth amend-
35116 U.S. 616 (1886).
3'425 U.S. at 407.
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ment-no longer can be considered either the semi-
nal pronouncement on fourth amendment law or a
correct statement regarding the interaction of the
fourth and fifth amendments.
It should also be noted that in addition to its fifth
amendment pronouncements in Fisher and Andres-
en, the Court further defined the fifth amendment
privilege as it relates to grand jury witnesses. In
Mandujano, while holding that the failure to advise a
witness of his Miranda rights neither entitles the
witness to commit perjury nor bars the introduction
of his false answers at a later perjury trial, the Court
stressed that a witness must claim the privilege where
appropriate or he will not be considered to have been
compelled. We are thus left with the implication
that, absent some evidence of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, a witness who incriminates himself by his
answers or through the requested production of his
private papers will be deemed to have waived his
privilege even though he was not warned of it. It
was this implication that Justice Brennan found
disturbing. 7
FOURTH AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
Any discussion of the importance to law enforce-
ment authorities of Fisher and Andresen would not
be complete without mentioning the Court's decision
in United States v. Miller 3  and certain fourth
amendment aspects of Andresen. In Miller, the
Court held that the fourth amendment does not
protect a bank customer from a government sub-
poena duces tecum directing the bank to produce its
records of its transactions with the customer because,
even though the Bank Secrecy Act requires the
maintenance of a bank's transactions with its cus-
tomers, the compulsion embodied in the Act does not
create a fourth amendment interest in the customer.
This holding is based upon the grounds that a bank
customer can have no legitimate expectation of
privacy in records which (1) are the business records
of the bank, (2) are not confidential communications
but negotiable instruments, and (3) contain informa-
tion voluntarily conveyed to the bank and exposed to
its employees. Miller thus resolves an issue left
unanswered in the 1974 case of California Banker's
Association v. Schultz," a decision which has made
government personnel hesitant about seeking to
obtain bank records of one suspected of engaging in
criminal activity.
Finally, the Court resolved an issue that should
"United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
3-425 U.S. 435 (1976).
3-416 U.S. 21 (1974).
aid law enforcement personnel in the execution of
search warrants. In Andresen, the petitioner asserted
that his fourth amendment rights were violated
because the language of the warrants to search his
offices was so broad as to make them impermissible
"general" warrants. More specifically, he objected to
the phrase added to each warrant at the end of a long
list of particularly described documents, "together
with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of
crime at this [time] unknown." The Court read the
phrase, not as a separate sentence, but as only
authorizing the search for and seizure of evidence
relating to the particular crime for which the
petitioner was then a suspect and for which he was
later indicted and convicted. Since the phrase did not
authorize the executing officers to search for and




The Court's decision this term in Hampton v.
United States' reflects a recognition of the difficul-
ties which face law enforcement officers in combat-
ting narcotics offenses. Consistent with its ruling in
United States v. Russell"' the Court in Hampton
held that a defendant who is predisposed to commit
the offense with which he is charged cannot avail
himself of an entrapment defense even where govern-
ment agents are significantly involved. In Hampton,
the facts disclosed that the government was both the
supplier and the buyer of the narcotics which
Hampton was accused of distributing. Thus, the
government's involvement in the offense clearly was
more extensive than it was in Russell. 'A plurality
of the Court, rejecting Hampton's due process argu-
ment,"' nonetheless found Russell controlling
because, as in Russell, the government agents were
acting in concert with the defendant who concededly
was predisposed to commit the crime. The plurality
"0425 U.S. 484 (1976).
4"411 U.S. 423 (1973).
42In Russell, the government was involved to the extent
that it supplied a legal but difficult to obtain ingredient of
the contraband that was the subject of the Russell indict-
ment.
41In Russell, the Court said:
[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would abso-
lutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction.
411 U.S. at 431-32.
1976]
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opinion suggests that the prosecution of a predis-
posed defendant never can be prohibited, regardless
of the "outrageousness" of the government's con-
duct:
If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with
a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy
lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but
in prosecuting the police under the applicable provi-
sions of the state or federal law. "
Concurring Justice Powell, joined by Justice Black-
mun, believed that Russell and other predisposition
cases did not go so far and was unwilling to conclude
that "an analysis other than one limited to predis-
position would never be appropriate under due
process principles." '"
Hampton thus settles an issue that has been raised
in an increasing number of cases since the Fifth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Bueno, 46 which
held that where the government supplies the contra-
band allegedly distributed by the defendant, entrap-
ment is established as a matter of law. Although
government involvement of the sort disclosed in
Hampton is to many distasteful in the extreme, it is
not illegal for, as Hampton noted, the due process
clause may be invoked only when government activ-
ity "violates some protected right of the defend-
ant. "'41 In addition to helping to combat the traffic in
narcotics at the street level, Hampton should signifi-
cantly reduce the confusion regarding the defense of
entrapment which was left in the wake of Russell.
Discovery and Disclosure
In an opinion of particular significance to prosecu-
tors, the Court ruled in United States v. Agurs "'that
a prosecutor's failure to provide unrequested mate-
rial that is helpful to the defense does not deprive a
defendant of a fair trial under the rule of Brady v.
Maryland. "' The majority opinion, written by the
Court's newest member, Mr. Justice Stevens, clari-
fied two questions that long have troubled both
prosecutors and defense counsel: (1) the significance
of the failure of defense counsel to request certain
material; and (2) the standard by which the failure of
the prosecutor to volunteer exculpatory material is to
be tested.
As to the first question, the Court declared that
44425 U.S. at 490.
4'Id. at 493.
4"447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
4 '425 U.S. at 490 (emphasis in the original).
4'96 S.Ct. 2392 (1976).
49373 U.S. 83 (1963).
there was no significant difference between cases in
which there is only a general request for Brady
material and one in which there has been no request
at all. This is so because in a general request
situation, in which exculpatory material may be
unknown to defense counsel, a prosecutor is given no
better notice by a general request than if no request
is made. On the other hand, if the material is so
obviously exculpatory that it necessarily puts the
prosecutor on notice of a duty to produce, that duty
arises even if no request is made.
As to the second question, the standard which
governs the prosecutor's failure to volunteer exculpa-
tory material is not the good or bad faith of the
prosecutor, but rather the materiality of the undis-
closed information as it pertains to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. This is to be determined
by examining the entire record with a view toward
whether the omission creates a reasonable doubt
about guilt.
This term also brought further definition of what
constitutes a "statement" of a government witness
under the Jencks Act."0 In Goldberg v. United
States, 51 the government declined to turn over to
defense counsel certain writings of government law-
yers of conversations with the government's key
prosecution witness. The government's argument in
refusing to produce the writings following a defense
Jencks Act request was that the writings were the
work product of government counsel. The Court
unanimously agreed that the Jencks Act requires
government counsel upon appropriate request to
produce any writing relating to the subject matter of
a prosecution witness' testimony if the statement has
been "signed or otherwise adopted or approved" 52by
the witness. The Court also agreed that there is no
work product exception for government lawyers for
statements that are otherwise producible under the
Jencks Act. According to Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, any matter contained in the writings
that could not fairly be said to be the witness' own
statements or that constituted government counsel's
selection, interpretations and interpolations may
properly be excised under the Act. " Thus, "the
primary policy underlying the work product doc-
trine-i.e., protection of the privacy of an attorney's
mental processes . . . is adequately safeguarded by
the Jencks Act itself." "
1018 U.S.C. §3500 (1970).
51425 U.S. 94 (1976).
1118 U.S.C. §3500(e)(1) (1970).
5 See 18 U.S.C. §3500 (c) (1970).
"'425 U.S. at 106.
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Pre-Trial Publicity
In deciding Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, "' the Court resolved a fair trial-free press
conflict in favor of the right of the press to be free of
prior restraints. The conflict arose in a highly
publicized murder case in which the trial court had
entered a pre-trial gag order which substantially
restricted press coverage of the trial. " Emphasizing
that "prior restraints on speech and publication are
the most serious and the least tolerable infringement
on First Amendment rights," " the Court deter-
mined that the gag order was not justified because
there were alternative measures, such as those enun-
ciated in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 58 which adequately
would have protected the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Moreover, the gag order was found to be an
unworkable method of protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial because of the problems inherent
in managing and enforcing a pre-trial restraining
order. Finally, the Court also found part of the order
to be vague and overbroad.
Nebraska Press Association is particularly signifi-
cant because it is the first prior restraint case to be
considered by the Court which involved restrictive
orders entered to protect a defendant's right to a
fair trial. Unanswered, however, is the question of
whether a prior restraint in a situation similar to that
involved in Nebraska Press Association might ever be
justifiable.
Capital Punishment
In a series of cases that will have a substantial im-
pact on the administration of justice in the United
States, the Court ruled this term that capital punish-
ment, at least for the crime of murder, does not in-
variably violate the Constitution. In Gregg v.
Georgia, 9Proffitt v. Florida '0 and Jurek v. Texas, 6"
all of which involved defendants charged with mur-
der, the Court declared that the particular state
capital punishment statutes passed constitutional
muster, while the statutes involved in Woodson v.
North Carolina 62 and Roberts v. Louisiana ' were
5196 S.Ct. 2791 (1976).
"The gag order which the Court reviewed was a
modification by the Nebraska Supreme Court of the trial
court's order.
5796 S.Ct. at 2802.
58384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6"96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
6096 S.Ct. 2950 (1976).
6196 S.Ct. 2950 (1976).
6296 S.Ct. 2978 (1976).
6396 S.Ct. 3001 (1976).
held violative of the eight and fourteenth amend-
ments. The Court ruled in Gregg that capital pun-
ishment is not per se unconstitutional. 64 After re-
viewing the death penalty cases that had been be-
fore the Court over the years, including its ruling in
Furman v. Georgia, 65 the plurality 66 pointed out
that the constitutionality of capital punishment long
had been both assumed and asserted. The Court then
directed its attention toward an "assessment of con-
temporary values," to be determined by "objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given
sanction." 67 Such an assessment was necessary, ac-
cording to the plurality, because the "Eighth
Amendment has not been regarded as a static con-
cept." 66
In analyzing contemporary values, the Court con-
cluded that, in light of the enactment in the wake of
Furman of death penalty statutes in at least thirty-
five states, it was evident that a large proportion of
American society believed capital punishment to be
an appropriate and necessary sanction. Addition-
ally, the actions of juries in continuing to impose the
death penalty following Furman was seen as another
objective index of contemporary values.
In addition to assessing contemporary values, the
Court deemed it necessary to decide whether the
death penalty accorded with the "dignity of man" 6"
in that it was not excessive. "Excessiveness" was
defined as unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
and as a sanction grossly unproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Considering this issue, the
Court looked to what it believed to be the two main
social purposes of capital punishment: retribution
and deterrence. Retribution, the Court found, was
essential to an ordered society. Although studies of
the deterrent value of capital punishment disclosed
"That ruling was reaffirmed in the other four death
penalty cases.
"408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman barred executions under
state capital punishment statutes which were in existence at
the time of the decision.
66In each case, a plurality composed of Justices Stewart,
Powell and Stevens wrote the lead opinion. Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
concurred in Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, and
JIrek v. Texas, and dissented in Woodson v. North Caro-
lina and Roberts v. Louisiana. Justice Blackmun, in one-
line statements, concurred in the judgments in Gregg,
Profitt and Jurek and dissented in Woodson and Roberts.
Justices Brennan..and Marshall dissented in Gregg, Prof-
fitt and Jurek and concurred in the judgments in Woodson
and Roberts.





inconclusive results, the Court suggested that deter-
rence is an issue which should properly be resolved
by the various state legislatures. As to the second
aspect of excessiveness, the Court found that, at least
for the crime of murder, the death penalty was not
disproportionate because "it is an extreme sanction,
suitable to the most extreme of crimes." 7' Accord-
ingly, the Court held that:
[T]he death penalty is not a form of punishment that
may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances
of the offense, regardless of the character of the
offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in
reaching the decision to impose it."
The precise holding with respect to the per se
constitutionality of capital punishment reflects the
essential concerns of the plurality in its consideration
of the capital sentencing statutes involved respec-
tively in Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson and
Roberts. Essentially, the Court found the Georgia,
Florida and Texas statutes to be constitutionally
sound because each statute contained procedures that
would require the sentencing tribunal, whether jury
or judge, to consider the circumstances of the crime
and the criminal before imposing sentence, and to
focus on the characteristics of the convicted defen-
dant. Moreover, each statute provided for review in a
manner that would ensure that similar results were
reached in similar cases. Because the procedures set
forth in the statutes carefully controlled the sentenc-
ing tribunal's discretion by providing objective stan-
dards to guide its use of information relevant to the
imposition of sentence, the concern expressed in Fur-
man-that the death penalty not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner-had been met by
the Georgia, Florida and Texas statutes.
On the other hand, the mandatory death penalty
statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana were
deemed violative of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments because: (1) analysis of the actions of legisla-
tures and juries revealed that mandatory imposition
of the death penalty did not reflect contemporary
values; (2) North Carolina's and Louisiana's statutes
did not eliminate the vice of unbridled jury discretion
which was the central concern of Furman; and (3)
neither statute provided for "particularized consider-
ation of relevant aspects of the character and record
of each convicted defendant before the imposition
upon him of a sentence of death." 2
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the decisions of the Supreme Court this
term reflect a tougher stance on law enforcement.
This is as it should be, for numerous decisions
rendered in the 1960's resulted in-the freeing of
obviously guilty defendants on technicalities which
were not constitutionally mandated. The return of
the pendulum toward stricter law enforcement prom-
ises the beginning of a new and more appropriate
balancing between societal rights and due process
toward persons accused of transgressing those rights.
"°Id. at 2932.
71id. 7296 S.Ct. at 2991.
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